showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation principle does extend to this setting. However, we show that it does not extend to a setting in which more than one agent has private information.
Introduction
In many contracting situations, the parties are unable fully to commit to ex post actions. For examples of analysis of a variety of such situations, see La¤ont and Tirole (1988) , Khalil (1997) , Crawford and Sobel (1982) , Dewatripont (1989) . One di¢ culty with analyzing such models is that the revelation principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin, 1979) does not apply. Bester and Strausz (2001) , however, showed that a variant of the revelation principle does apply in some environments without commitment. More precisely, they showed that in a model with a principal and one agent, for any incentive-e¢ cient equilibrium of an arbitrary mechanism, there is an equilibrium of a direct mechanism in which each type of the agent gets the same payo¤ and the principal gets the same or more.
In a companion paper (Bester and Strausz, 2000) they showed that this result does not extend to the multi-agent case. The counterexample has two agents, only one of whom (agent 1) has private information. Agent 1 has two possible types. They exhibit an equilibrium, say , for a mechanism with three messages for agent 1 such that any equilibrium of any two-message mechanism 0 gives a lower payo¤ either to the principal or to agent 2. Thus a mechanism with two messages cannot replicate or improve on the outcome of the mechanism with three messages. However, in this example, one can construct an equilibrium of 0 in which both types of agent 1 get the same payo¤ as in and the sum of the principal's and agent 2's payo¤ is higher. Therefore, if the players have quasi-linear utility for money and they can make ex ante transfers, it is possible in 0 for agent 2 and each type of agent 1 to get the same payo¤ as in and for the principal to get more. The case of quasi-linear utility is a leading one in contract theory and it requires negligible, if any, commitment to make ex ante transfers.
In this paper we show that the Bester-Strausz result extends to the multiagent case with quasi-linear utilities and ex ante transfers if only one agent has private information. We also examine the case in which more than one agent has private information. We provide an example with two agents, each of whom has two types, and an equilibrium of a mechanism with three messages for agent 1 and two for agent 2, such that any equilibrium of a mechanism with two messages each has a lower total payo¤ than ex ante (i.e., evaluated before players learn their types). Therefore it is not possible in such a mechanism to make each type of each player as well o¤ as in .
The conclusion is that in this setting the revelation principle fails to hold when there are at least two agents, but only if at least two agents have private information.
Model
There is a principal (P ) and 2 agents (1 and 2). 1 is privately informed about his type i 2 = f 1 ; :::; I g. The probability that 1 is of type i is denoted by i and we assume that this is common knowledge. 2 has no private information. 3 P can choose an action y 2 Y . We allow parties to make transfers which enter into payo¤s in an additively separable way. Thus, for given action y, 1's type i and transfers t = (t 1 ; t 2 ), where t j is the payment from P to j 2 f1; 2g, we denote P 's payo¤ by V i (y) t 1 t 2 and the agents'payo¤s by U j i (y) + t j . 4 A mechanism speci…es a …nite message space M = fm 1 ; :::; m H g for 1 and a pair of transfers t. The mechanism induces a two-stage game of incomplete information, in which 1 chooses, for each type i , a probability distribution q i ( ) over M . On receipt of message m h , P updates his beliefs about 1's type to p(m h ) = (p 1 (m h ); :::; p I (m h )) and then chooses an action y(m h ). Let q( ) = (q 1 ( ); :::; q I ( )) and denote by q(m h ) = P i i q i (m h ) the overall probability that message m h is sent. The pro…le (q( ), p( ), y( )) constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism if (i) for each m h , y(m h ) maximizes P 's expected payo¤ given his belief p i (m h ), (ii) for each i , q( ) maximizes 1's expected payo¤ given y(:), and (iii) p(:) follows Bayes'Rule whenever possible.
A Revelation Principle
For a given mechanism = [M; t], is it possible to replicate the same (or higher) payo¤s for all parties with a direct mechanism d = [ ; t d ]? Bester and Strausz (2001) showed that with only one agent, without transfers, the answer to this question is 'yes'. The Bester and Strausz (2000) example, however, showed that this is not necessarily true if there are at least two agents. The example has = f 1 ; 2 g; Y = <, V 1 (y) = y 2 , V 2 (y) = (2 y) 2 , U 1 1 (y) = (0:5 y) 2 , U 1 2 (y) = (1:5 y) 2 and U 2 i (y) = 10(1 y) 2 , for i = 1; 2. They exhibit an equilibrium for an M with three messages in which P gets 0:5, each type of 1 gets 0:25, and 2 gets 5 and show that no equilibrium for an M with two messages can replicate or improve on this outcome. However, with two messages, the pooling equilibrium with equal weight on each message gives 1 to P , 0:25 to each type of 1 and 0 to 2, so if transfers were possible each type of each player could be made at least as well o¤.
In this section we show that the Bester-Strausz revelation principle extends to the set-up of section 2. The argument is closely based on theirs, but we include it here for completeness.
We say that = (q; p; y; tjM ) is incentive-feasible if (q; p; y) is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism [M; t]. Slightly abusing notation, we denote the expected payo¤s in this equilibrium by V ( ),
. This is a direct extension of the notion of incentive e¢ ciency in Bester and Strausz (2001) . Consider another de…nition:
It is easy to see that in our setting, with monetary transfers, these two de…nitions are equivalent. If fails De…nition 2 (P and agent 2 can jointly be made better o¤) then for an appropriate choice of transfer t 0 it fails De…nition 1 (P can be made better o¤ and agent 2 at least as well o¤).
We now argue that De…nition 2 allows us to apply the same logic as in Bester and Strausz (2001) to prove the revelation principle in our set-up. The argument establishes that for any incentive-e¢ cient = (q; p; y; tjM ) it is possible to …nd an incentive feasible 0 = (q 0 ; p; y; tjM 0 ) with jM 0 j I that gives the same joint payo¤ to the principal and agent 2 and the same payo¤ to each type of agent 1.
Let
In that case if (q; p; y; tjM ) is incentive-feasible then (q 0 ; p; y; tjM 0 ) is incentive-feasible for any M 0 M containing the support of q 0 . This is because, for any m h , p(m h ) is the correct belief for P and y(m h ) is optimal given p(m h ), and each type i of agent 1 puts positive probability only on messages in the support of q i (i.e. optimal messages, given y(:)). Furthermore, for each type of agent 1, (q; p; y; tjM ) and (q 0 ; p; y; tjM 0 ) give the same expected payo¤.
Suppose that = (q; p; y; tjM ) is incentive-e¢ cient according to De…nition 2, and jM j > I, with q(m h ) > 0 for each m h 2 M . Consider the following class of -perturbations of q. q 0
By incentive-e¢ ciency no such perturbation can increase V + U 2 and so = (1; : :
for some constants f~ i g i (cf. Lemma 1 in Bester and Strausz (2001) ).
Since P m h q(m h )p i (m h ) = i , 2 < I is a convex combination of the jM j posterior beliefs p(m h ). Therefore can be expressed as a convex combination of I of these vectors, corresponding to a subset M 0 of the messages with jM 0 j I:
q 0 is a -perturbation of q since, for each m h , each type of agent 1 re-scales its probability of m h in the same way. Therefore 0 = (q 0 ; p; y; tjM 0 ) is incentive-feasible and U 1 i ( 0 ) = U 1 i ( ) for all i. We need to show that V ( 0 )+U 2 ( 0 ) = V ( )+U 2 ( ): this will establish that, choosing an appropriate t 0 , we can …nd a PBE which is payo¤-equivalent to and which uses only I messages. But
where the second equality comes from (2) and the third from Bayes' rule. Similarly,
Hence, since we can identify M 0 with the set of types , we have
Proposition If = (q; p; y; tjM ) is incentive-e¢ cient, then there exists a direct mechanism d = ( ; t d ) and an incentive-feasible d = (q d ; p d ; y d ; t d j ) such that and d are payo¤-equivalent. 5
Two privately informed agents
Here we consider an example in which the agents, 1 and 2, are both privately informed about their types. There are two types, a and b, and each agent, independently, has probability 0.5 of being each type. Therefore there are four equally likely states of nature, aa; ab; ba and bb, where the …rst letter refers to 1's type and the second to 2's. P 's action set is fy aa ; y ab ; y ba ; y bb ; y ca ; y cb g and his payo¤ as a function of the state of nature and his chosen action are given in the following matrix: The matrix below gives, for each type of each agent, the agent's payo¤ as a function of P 's action. For example, the top row is the payo¤ function of 1a, type a of agent 1. We refer to the beliefs and strategy of P in any given equilibrium 6 as follows. After 1 has sent message m k and 2 has sent message m l P 's equilibrium action, if pure, is denoted by y(m k ; m l ), his belief (probability) that 1 is type a is p 1 (m k ) and his belief that 2 is type a is p 2 (m l ). Mixed strategies of the agents are denoted by q 1 i and q 2 j : thus, for example, q 1 a (m) is the probability that type a of agent 1 sends message m. For an equilibrium , V ( ); U 1 i ( ); U 2 j ( ) refer, respectively, to the expected payo¤s of P , type i of 1 and type j of 2 (i; j 2 fa; bg). All proofs are in the Appendix.
First, consider a mechanism with no transfers, = [M 1 ; M 2 ], in which agent 1's message space M 1 contains three messages, m a , m b and m c , and agent 2's message space M 2 contains two messages, m a and m b .
Claim 1 The mechanism has an equilibrium in which 1a sends messages m a and m c with equal probability, 1b sends messages m b and m c with equal probability, and agent 2 separates -2a sends message m a and 2b sends message m b . The total ex ante expected equilibrium payo¤ is 13 8 . In the remainder of the section we show that any mechanism 0 that uses just two messages for each agent must, in any equilibrium, have an ex ante total payo¤ below 13 8 . Suppose that M 1 = M 2 = fm a ; m b g. Since the meaning of messages is arbitrary and the prior is uniform, it is without loss of generality to assume that p i (m a ) 1 2 and p i (m b ) 1 2 for i = 1; 2. The diagram below represents P 's optimal action as a function of his posterior beliefs (p 1 ; p 2 ). For example, y aa is optimal if and only if p First, consider equilibria in which the action is in the set fy ca ; y cb g with probability 1. There are many such equilibria, with 2 pooling or separating and 1 pooling or partially separating. For example, one is as fol-
In any such equilibrium, 1 gets 1 2 , 2 gets at most 0, and P gets at most 3 4 , so the total ex ante expected payo¤ is at most 10 8 . Next, we look for equilibria with strictly positive probability on the set fy aa ; y ab ; y ba ; y bb g. In that case, p 1 (m a ) 2 ( 1 2 ; 1] since, if p 1 (m a ) = 1 2 , either p 1 (m b ) = 1 2 or both types of 1 send m a with probability 1, which would imply pr(fy ca ; y cb g) = 1. We distinguish the cases p 1 (m a ) 2 ( 1 2 ; 1) and p 1 (m a ) = 1: Claim 2 In any equilibrium of 0 with pr(fy aa ; y ab ; y ba ; y bb g) > 0 and p 1 (m a ) 2 ( 1 2 ; 1), (i) 1a sends message m a for sure and 1b sends both messages with strictly positive probability,
, 2a sends message m a for sure, 2b sends message m b for sure and the total payo¤ is less than 13 8 , (iii) if p 2 (m) = 1 2 for any positive probability message m, the total payo¤ is less than 12 8 .
Turning to p 1 (m a ) = 1, note that by the symmetry of the game, we have already considered all cases in which p 1 (m b ) 2 (0; 1 2 ]. So it remains to consider the case p 1 (m a ) = 1; p 1 (m b ) = 0:
Claim 3 In any equilibrium of 0 with pr(fy aa ; y ab ; y ba ; y bb g) > 0, if 1a sends m a and 1b sends m b for sure, p 2 (m) = 1 2 for any positive probability message m and the total payo¤ is less than 12 8 . In the equilibrium of the three-message mechanism in Claim 1 agent 2 separates. To achieve this separation P needs to put positive probability on the set fy ca , y cb g since agent 2's types have the same preferences over the other actions. If P cannot commit he will not play these actions unless he is unsure about agent 1's type. Hence, 1 must pool to some extent. However, pooling by 1 is costly and the optimal degree of separation requires three messages rather than two.
It is therefore the interplay between the incentives of the two privately informed agents that leads to a failure of the Revelation Principle.
Appendix
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose P 's beliefs and action rule are:
Clearly the beliefs satisfy Bayes'rule given the agents'strategies and the action rule is optimal for P given the beliefs. If 1 sends message m k , k = a; b; c, he expects P to choose y ka or y kb , with equal probability. Thus, 1a gets expected payo¤ 1 2 from m a , 1 2 from m b and 1 2 from m c , so is willing to randomize between m a and m c . The argument for 1b is symmetric. If 2 sends message m l , l = a; b, he expects P to choose y al and y bl each with probability 1 4 , and y cl with probability 1 2 . Thus, 2a gets 0 from m a and 1 2 from m b while 2b gets 1 from m a and 1 2 from m b . Therefore the given strategies form an equilibrium. In each state, P is equally likely to get 1 or 3 4 , so his expected payo¤ is 7 8 . 2a's is 0, 2b's is 1 2 and both types of 1 get 1 2 . This establishes the claim. Proof of Claim 2:
(i) If neither type of 1 sends m a then p 1 (m b ) = 1 2 and pr(fy ca ; y cb g) = 1. So pr(1 sends m a ) > 0. Similarly, pr(1 sends m b ) > 0. If q 1 b (m a ) = 0 then p 1 (m a ) = 1. Hence q 1 b (m a ) > 0. Also, we know that q 1 b (m b ) > 0 because pr(1 sends m b ) > 0 and by assumption q 1 b (m b ) q 1 a (m b )Let U i j (m) be ij's expected payo¤ from sending m, for i = 1; 2 and j = a; b.
Since pr(fy aa ; y ab gj1 sends m b ) = pr(fy ba ; y bb gj1 sends m a ) = 0,
with at least one inequality strict since pr(fy aa ; y ab ; y ba ; y bb g) > 0. Therefore U 1 a (m a ) > U 1 a (m b ). It follows that 1a does not send m b . (ii) Note that in this case y(m b ; m a ) = y ba and y(m b ; m b ) = y bb . First, 2b strictly prefers y bb to y ba and pr(1 sends m b ) > 0. Second, 2b (weakly) prefers any mixture of y cb and y ab to any mixture of y ca and y aa . So,
. This shows that 2b only sends m b . Second, because 1b is indi¤erent between m a and m b we know p 1 (m a ) 7 8 , otherwise he would prefer m b . If p 1 (m a ) < 7 8 ; U 1 b (m a ) = 1 2 and therefore also U 1 b (m b ) = 1 2 . This implies that 2a must send m a for sure. If p 1 (m a ) = 7 8 ; by Bayes' rule we must have q 1 b (m a ) = 1 7 and q 1 b (m b ) = 6 7 . Because U 2 a (m a ) = 0 we need U 2 a (m b ) = 0 for 2a to be mixing between m a and m b : Therefore, after message pair (m a ; m b ) P must put weights 7 12 and 5 12 on actions y cb and y ab respectively. But this contradicts that 1b is indi¤erent between m a and m (iii) Since 2's strategy is pooling, P's action is uncorrelated with 2's type, so P cannot get a payo¤ of more than 1 2 . Let pr(y bb j1 sends m b ) = p bb , so pr(y ba j1 sends m b ) = 1 p bb . Also, let pr(y aa j1 sends m a ) = p aa and pr(y ab j1 sends m a ) = p ab .
Then U 1 a = 1 2 (1 p aa p ab ) + p aa and U 1 b = 1 2 (1 p aa p ab ) p ab (since 2b sends m a with positive probability in equilibrium). Therefore 1's ex ante expected payo¤ is 1 2 p ab . Conditional on 1 sending m b , U 2 a = U 2 b = p bb . Conditional on 1 sending m a , U 2 a p ab and U 2 b p ab . Letting q 1 b (m b ) = , 2's expected payo¤ is therefore at most 1 2 p bb +[ 1 2 (1 ) + 1 2 ]p ab . Thus the sum of 1's and 2's ex ante expected payo¤s is at most 1 2 +( 2 )(p bb p ab ) 1 2 + 2 . It follows that the sum of expected payo¤s is less than 12 8 : Proof of Claim 3: Suppose …rst that p 2 (m a ) > 1 2 > p 2 (m b ). Then y(m b ; m a ) = y ba and y(m b ; m b ) = y bb . In that case both types of 2 strictly prefer m b so p 2 (m b ) = 1 2 (contradiction). Therefore p 2 (m) = 1 2 for any positive probability m.
As in the previous proof, P gets at most 1 2 . Using the same notation as in the previous proof, 1a gets p aa , 1b gets p ba = 1 p bb , 2 gets 1 2 p bb + 1 2 p ab = 1 2 p bb + 1 2 (1 p aa ).
Therefore the total expected payo¤ is at most 3 2 .
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